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Abstract: Access to credit improves farmers’ productivity and income. However, farmers’ low access to credit remains 
a confounding issue in Afghanistan. This study predominantly aims to identify the challenges hindering the country’s 
financial sector from effectively serving agriculture. We used the triangulation method of data collection to capture the 
various dimensions of the challenges to formal agricultural credit access in Afghanistan. The results showed that com-
mercial banks are reluctant to provide credit for agricultural purposes. Financial institutions supply credit to farmers in 
a fragmented manner, rather than through a unified mechanism. Furthermore, farmers cited the cumbersome process of 
obtaining credit and the lack of suitable collateral for it as the most pressing issues. Moreover, a thematic analysis of key 
respondents’ interviews revealed that vulnerability to risk, operational restrictions, societal constraints, and the less ac-
tive real estate market are the predominant challenges to expanding formal agricultural credit. Finally, we present our 
suggestions to address these challenges. 
Keywords: formal agricultural credit, characteristics, challenges, thematic analysis, Afghanistan
Ⅰ   Introduction
The agriculture sector is the backbone of 
Afghanistan’s economy and economic development 
(Muradi and Boz, 2018). It makes about 23 percent of the 
GDP (gross domestic product). Furthermore, the sector 
has much importance in earning foreign currency; over 
80 percent of the country’s exports are agricultural 
commodities. Agriculture also plays a vital role in 
ensuring food security in the country. It provides most 
food for the people and is the primary source of livelihood 
for the forty-four percent of households (NSIA, 2019).  
In the past two decades, there has been significant 
attention to developing the country’s agriculture sector. 
The Afghan Government, along with its donor partners, 
implemented various programs and projects for its 
agriculture sector growth. These development activities 
were focused on bringing commercialization opportunities 
and technical change into agriculture. These programs 
have achieved a number of successes, especially in the 
horticultural sub-sector, such as the increment in the 
production of vegetables, commercial potato, spices 
(particularly saffron), and temperate fruits to some extent, 
has increased farmers’ income (Pain, 2019).
However, the country’s agriculture sector is still 
characterized by low productivity, low income, and 
subsistence farming; about half the farmers produce for 
their consumption. They can barely market their produce 
(World Bank, 2018). Besides, a vast agricultural land 
(9.6%) is left fallow (CSO, 2014). These are primarily 
due to farmers’ limited or no access to capital. 
Furthermore, the sector is producing below the potential 
(Muradi and Boz, 2018).  These problems have caused 
Afghan farmers to be trapped in the vicious cycle of 
poverty. The poverty traps arise chiefly from inadequate 
access to productive assets particularly capital; low farm 
productivity; low levels of human capital; poor 
infrastructure; and underdeveloped market systems 
(Akenbor, 2015). Therefore, developing the agriculture 
sector of the country continues to be a crucial policy 
challenge in Afghanistan.  
A vast amount of literature recommends access to 
credit to the operation of agricultural production. It 
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improves farmers’ productivity and income as it lightens 
capital restraints (Reyes and Lensink, 2010; Castro and 
Taxeira, 2012; Pearce, 2004; Hartarska et al., 2015). 
According to Foltz (2004), access to credit expands 
access to the needed inputs required for production. Low 
access to credit is a barrier to the agricultural production 
process, disrupting the procurement of improved inputs 
(Abdallah, 2016a). Low access to formal credit is one of 
the central factors responsible for the inadequate 
performance of agriculture (Masaood and Maharjan, 
2020). Gashayie and Singh (2015) mention that access to 
credit by farmers is as crucial as always. Akenbor (2015) 
argues that agricultural credit is instrumental in breaking 
the poverty trap. As per Bashir and Azeem (2008), 
although credit is not a direct means of production, it 
helps transform subsistence farming into a more 
commercialized system. The vicious cycle of poverty 
shatters when a timely and sufficient credit is injected to 
it (Akenbor, 2015; Mosley, 2006).  It spurs the adoption 
of new technologies by eliminating capital restrictions.
Given this, the Afghan Government and its donor 
partners have intervened in Afghanistan’s rural areas to 
improve credit access. After the new Government’s onset 
in 2001, several initiatives were launched to increase 
credit access, such as the formation of credit unions, 
microfinance, and other financial institutions (e.g., the 
Agricultural Development Fund). Besides, following the 
ratification of the new banking regulation in 2003, the 
commercial banking developed. Currently, several 
banking and non-banking financial institutions are 
functioning in the country. All these financial institutions 
are registered with the Government and function under 
specific laws and regulations. Therefore, in this study, 
formal agricultural credit refers to the credit offered by 
formal financial institutions regulated by laws.
However, despite considerable efforts to streamline, 
expand, and formalize the credit system, the success falls 
short of proclamations, plans, and programs. The formal 
financial sector of Afghanistan ignores the masses of 
farmers. Consequently, access to formal credit by farmers 
remains low. For instance, in 2018, only around 37,000 
farmers participated in formal credit (MISFA, 2018). 
Besides, the coverage of formal credit remains meager 
over the years, i.e., only four percent of farming 
households participated in formal credit in 2008 (Hussain, 
2009). It decreased to 3.1% in 2018 (MISFA, 2018). This 
situation has led to a massive mismatch between the 
supply and demand for formal agriculture credit in 
Afghanistan. According to the Agricultural Development 
Fund (2019), the country’s demand for agricultural credit 
was 131.1 billion AFN1) in 2017. However, the total 
amount of disbursed credit to the agricultural sector was 
only 6.18 billion AFN, of which most parts went to 
commercial farmers and agribusiness companies. 
Farmers need funds to purchase indispensable 
farming inputs. However, most farmers remain 
unbankable and money-wise expelled in the country - 
distressing the socioeconomic status of the vast majority 
of small and poor farmers. Due to the restricted formal 
credit for farmers, informal credit remains the dominant 
credit source for farmers. According to NRVA (2005), 
42% of households in Afghanistan’s rural areas relied on 
informal credit. Informal credit lenders do not provide 
credit in a well-defined way. Their credit is often costly to 
people – detrimental for economic development (Manig, 
1999; Rajeev and Deb, 1998). Hence, this study attempts 
to determine the challenges that keep the country’s 
financial sector from serving agriculture effectively and 
policies to alleviate these restrictions. This study also 
focuses on the characteristics of formal credit for 
agriculture and its historical perspectives in the country.
The primary motivation behind this study is that, to 
the extent of our knowledge, no study has analyzed how 
formal agriculture credit is constrained in Afghanistan’s 
context. Owing to the socioeconomic differences, the 
studies of other contexts may not suit the country’s 
situation. Furthermore, extant literature partly investigates 
the challenges of agricultural credit. No study on the 
developing countries thoroughly assesses how formal 
credit is restricted for farmers. This study analyzes the 
challenges from different dimensions that hamper the 
expansion of agricultural credit. More specifically, we 
analyze the challenges of agricultural credit from three 
aspects: analyzing gaps in the regulatory system, 
challenges perceived by farmers while using formal 
agricultural credit, and the challenges faced by financial 
institutions in lending to farmers. We also present our 
insight to address these restrictions.
The specific objectives of this study are:
   •  To analyze the characteristics of formal 
agricultural credit in Afghanistan. 
   •  To identify the challenges that keep the formal 
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financial institutions of Afghanistan from 
serving agriculture effectively.
This paper is structured as follows: the subsequent 
section presents the literature review. Section III 
explicates our data and discusses the methods used, 
followed by a presentation of the results in Section IV. 
Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
Ⅱ   Literature review 
1   Features of the formal agricultural credit markets
Compared to other markets, due to imperfect and 
costly information, credit markets often operate 
imperfectly. Credit markets create profits in sanctioning 
credit. Credit is the cash exchange for a commitment that 
the cash will be returned in at some specific point of time 
in the future. The commitment is often supported with 
some supplementary stipulations such as the covenants, 
collateral, and guarantors. However, the borrowers 
sometimes fail to hold the promise. Therefore, financial 
institutions opt for more rigorous screening. Thus, they 
ration their applicants to realize who is more likely to 
reimburse the installments (Dowd, 1992). Additionally, 
there are two further problems, moral hazard and adverse 
selection. Adverse selection is when a person with a high 
likelihood of default is most likely to seek credit 
(Hollinger, 2011; OECD, 1999; Jia, 2008). Moral hazards 
happen when the credit is diverted from the purpose it has 
initially been obtained to any other purpose (Repullo and 
Suarez, 2000). Moral hazard is more troubling if the 
credit diversion is from productive purposes to 
unproductive purposes.
The imperfection in the formal credit market 
augments when formal financial institutions provide 
credit in rural areas. Because rural areas are characterized 
by poverty, low density of population, high-income 
inconstancies, high risk, and the dominance of farming as 
a source of livelihood. All these problems increase 
transaction costs and make the credit market more 
imperfect.  
In addition to the challenges of financial 
intermediation in general and financial intermediation in 
the rural areas, the distinct peculiarities of agricultural 
credit make agricultural credit different from the credit 
supplied to other sectors. This is due to the seasonality 
and the systematic risk intrinsic to the agriculture sector. 
The production of crops and livestock creates a time lag 
in production, which originates seasonality in the 
agricultural production process. Agricultural production 
is also subjected to the haphazard impact of weather, 
pests, and diseases-beyond an individual farmer’s control. 
This put the farmers in a distressful situation of systematic 
risk.  Furthermore, Jia (2008) states that the condition of 
rural infrastructure, the presence and quality of research 
and extension, and the existence of a well-functioning 
court system affect farmers’ access to credit. 
Poverty level is very high in Afghanistan and most 
poor live in the rural areas (NSIA, 2019). According to 
Banerjee and Duflo (2007), formal credit provision can 
help rural people escape poverty. Akenbor (2015) found a 
significant relationship between financial inclusion and 
poverty in Nigeria. The poverty trap is a situation where 
basic needs, such as food, clothing, and shelter, are 
lacking. It occurs when a household cannot meet its basic 
necessities. Poverty traps endure primarily in rural, 
agricultural-based, and low-labor productivity regions 
(Akenbor, 2015; Mosley, 2006). The poverty traps arise 
chiefly from inadequate access to productive assets 
particularly capital; high dependence on agriculture; low 
farm productivity; low levels of human capital; poor 
infrastructure; and underdeveloped market systems. The 
poverty trap self-reinforce itself and lets poverty to 
endure. If it remains from generation to generation, the 
trap starts to strengthen itself if steps are not taken to 
shatter the cycle (Costas and Stachurski, 2005). 
Agricultural credit provision increases farmers’ 
productivity and income, thus it should be instrumental in 
breaking the poverty trap.
2  Challenges faced by farmers in utilizing formal 
credit
Diagne (1999) and Doan et al. (2010) categorize the 
challenges to agricultural credit as “demand-side 
challenges” and “supply-side challenges.” The demand 
side challenges are inherent to farmers, such as low 
education, low resource endowment, and societal norms, 
resulting in low credit participation. The supply-side 
challenges are the challenges that make it difficult for 
financial institutions to offer timely and enough credit to 
farmers. Supply-side challenges can impede access to 
credit. 
All these problems generate non-voluntary credit 
exclusion and voluntary credit exclusion. A non-voluntary 
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credit exclusion happens when there is no right credit 
arrangement for farmers or when the farmers are too poor 
to participate in credit, although the credit is available for 
them. Voluntary credit exclusion occurs when the credit 
is available. However, people do not have the willingness 
to participate because of negative thoughts or experiences 
of participating in credit (Mohammed and Uraguchi, 
2017). For example, utilizing a conventional interest-
based credit is not allowed in Islam. Therefore, this 
religious belief causes voluntary exclusion in Muslim 
majority countries. According to Kim et al. (2018), 
peoples’ participation in formal credit in the Muslim 
majority countries is low. 
The extant literature on agricultural credit is mostly 
focused on the impact of access to formal agricultural 
credit on farmers’ production and income. Due to the 
various issues specific to agriculture, which are difficult 
to mitigate, access to and participation in credit pose 
serious challenges. However, a few studies examine the 
challenges that exist to the formal agricultural credit. For 
example, Dhakshana and Rajandran (2018) use the data 
from 205 farmers in India’s Cauvery Delta region to 
analyze the farmers’ challenges while utilizing formal 
credit for agriculture. They found that the repayment 
conditions, lack of collateral, higher interest rate, and the 
stringent procedure were the main challenges. Ayegba 
and Ikani (2013) utilize the data from 300 farmers in 
Nigeria to determine the farmers’ difficulties in accessing 
credit. They affirmed that the main challenges were the 
high interest rates, the lengthy procedure of loan approval, 
and overemphasizing on guarantors and collateral. 
Asogwa et al. (2014) analyses 130 farmers’ data to 
investigate their access to credit and the challenges in 
accessing credit. He found that the delay in the approval 
and lack of collateral were the main challenges in 
agricultural credit in Benue district, Nigeria. Admasu and 
Paul (2010) found that an inadequate amount of credit 
and default due to the lack of farmers’ awareness in 
Ethiopia are mainly restricting agricultural credit. Vincent 
et al. (2011) analyze the challenges to farmers in accessing 
formal credit. He found the lack of collateral and low 
awareness as central challenges to agricultural credit. 
The conclusions of these researches differ from 
context to context. Furthermore, most of these studies 
partially analyze what challenges restrict formal financial 
institutions to serve the agriculture sector better and what 
challenges the farmers face while utilizing formal credit 
for their agricultural activities. 
Ⅲ   Methodology
1   Data 
We use the triangulation of data collection methods 
that uses more than one way of data collection. The 
methods combine qualitative and quantitative data to 
capture different dimensions of the challenges to 
agricultural credit in Afghanistan. The triangulation of 
data collection methods helped to understand the 
characteristics of formal agricultural credit and the 
various factors that hinder formal agricultural credit. 
However, it also helped to understand the historical 
context within which formal agricultural credit evolved in 
Afghanistan.
At first, 13 policy documents and reports, which are 
most relevant to formal agricultural credit in Afghanistan, 
were reviewed to understand credit characteristics and 
identify the gaps that require improvement. It also helped 
us know about the historical perspectives of formal 
agricultural credit and its evolution.  The list of policy 
documents and reports is shown in Table 1 in the results 
and discussion section. 
To analyze the challenges farmers face in availing 
formal credit, 94 farmers who participated in formal 
credit for their agricultural purposes between 2016 and 
2018 were randomly selected in the three districts of 
Afghanistan. The districts are Behsood, Paghman, and 
Balkh, with an estimated rural population of 126,262, 
111,638, and 124,508, respectively (Central Statistics 
Organization, 2018). Behsood district is in Nangarhar 
province, Paghman district is in Kabul province, and 
Balkh district is situated in the Balkh2) province. These 
districts were chosen given the prominence of farming in 
the livelihood and the farmers’ accessibility to formal 
credit. The three districts are located in three different 
regions of Afghanistan, namely, Northern, Central, and 
Eastern regions. Three to four villages were randomly 
selected in each district. Finally, 98 formal credit users 
were randomly assigned to the sample. However, the data 
of ninety-four formal credit users farming households 
were usable in the sample for analyzing the challenges 
they face in using formal agricultural credit. The rest 
were incomplete. Figure 1 shows the three districts. 
To come up with the challenges to the expansion of 
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formal agricultural credit, 22 key informants were 
purposefully selected for interviews in the three cities, 
Kabul, Jalalabad, and Mazar. The interviewed key 
informants consisted of ten officials of the different 
financial institutions and 12 experts of the related field 
(four economists and financial intermediation specialists, 
five agricultural development specialists, and three 
academics). Therefore, the key informants’ data also 
include the challenges faced by formal financial 
institutions in lending to farmers. The data from interviews 
with all these stakeholders were utilized in doing 
qualitative analysis. Figure 1 also shows the three cities 
where the key informants were interviewed.
2   Analytical methods
The Friedman test was used to analyze and rank the 
farmers’ challenges in utilizing formal credit. The test 
uses the rank information of the data. It compares the 
mean rank among the related groups and indicates if the 
group differed significantly or not (Gravetter et al., 2016 
p.698). The farmers were asked to rank a group of six 
challenges they faced while using formal agricultural 
credit. The challenges were identified based on the 
literature review on the related topic and three case studies 
done before the three different districts’ survey.
Our data suit the assumptions of the test. We have 
used a 5-point scale, where ‘one’ denotes strongly 
disagree, and ‘five’ strongly agree. The dependent 
variable is the depth of the farmers’ problems, and the 
independent variables are the six listed problems.
This test uses the hypothesis of an identical 
population, so our null hypothesis is that the mean rank of 
all the problems is not different from each other. We 
selected the level of significance 0.05 as our sample was 
neither so large nor so small. Formulation of the 
hypothesis is as follow:
H0: CH1=CH2=CH3=CH4=CH5=CH6  
H1: Not all means are equal
Level of significance: α= 0.05
Table 1   Policies and reports reviewed to understand the characteristics of formal agricultural credit in Afghanistan
Policy/Report Organization/Institution Year
The first five-year plan of Afghanistan 1956-1961 The Royal Government of Afghanistan 1956
Agricultural Credit Project of Afghanistan International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1970
Agricultural credit in Afghanistan: a review of progress and 
problems from 1954 until 1972
Norvell, D. G. 1972
Afghanistan National Development Strategy Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2005
The Financial Sector in Afghanistan
Managing the Post-conflict Reform Process
World Bank 2005
Afghanistan National Development Strategy
A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth & 
Poverty Reduction (2008 – 2013)
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2008
A Critical Assessment of Microfinance in Afghanistan Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization 2008
State of Microfinance in Afghanistan Institute of Microfinance project on State of Microfinance in 
SAARC Countries
2009
Agriculture & Rural Development Sector Strategy Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2008
Banking Law of Afghanistan Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2016
Revitalizing Agriculture for Economic Growth, Job Creation 
and Food Security
The World Bank and the Government of Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan
2014
National Comprehensive Agriculture Development Priority 
Program 2016 – 2021
Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of 
Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock
2016
Microfinance Investment Support Agency, Annual Report MISFA 2018
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Friedman’s test tells whether there are overall 
differences among the groups. However, it does not 
determine which groupings vary from each other. To do 
this, a post hoc test is necessary. We have selected the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, which is used to compare two 
means (Meek et al., 2007).  As we conduct this test for 
multiple combinations (15 combinations), we need 
Bonferroni adjustment on the results we get from the 
Wilcoxon tests. If we do not implement this adjustment, 
we will face a Type I error. For Bonferroni adjustment, 
we take the significance level we were initially using 
(0.05) and divide it by the 15 combinations. We now have 
a new significance level of 0.05/15 = 0.0033. This implies 
that if the p-value is higher than 0.0033, we cannot come 
up with a statistically significant outcome in comparing 
the means of two challenges.
Thematic analysis was used to identify the main 
themes from the interaction with key respondents, which 
took place during the interviews. This allows an in-depth 
description of patterns in the data to be identified (Attard 
and Coulson, 2012). Transcripts of the interviews were 
read many times to ensure accurate understanding. 
Patterns within the data were coded, and passages from 
the original data were gathered into non-overlapping 
themes and subthemes. 
Ⅳ   Results and discussion
1  Historical overview and characteristics of formal 
credit for agriculture in Afghanistan
Appropriate policies are vital for effective and 
inclusive agricultural credit (Saqib et al., 2018). Therefore, 
it is essential to scrutinize the policies and programs of 
formal agricultural credit in Afghanistan. The first five-
year plan, devised in 1956, is the first policy document to 
integrate agricultural credit in its profile. After the 
formation of the new government in 2002, agricultural 
credit is somehow reflected in various policy documents 
(e.g., Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 
Agriculture & Rural Development Sector Strategy, and 
National Comprehensive Agriculture Development 
Priority Program) (Table 1.). 
The documents and the reports show that there are 
Figure 1   Study area
Source: Authors. 
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mainly three historical perspectives for formal agricultural 
credit in Afghanistan: pre-gap era, a gap in formal credit, 
and post-gap era. They also show two approaches to 
formal agricultural credit, new and old, consistent with 
the worldwide development of agricultural and rural 
credit. Both approaches mainly aim to enhance the 
income of farmers and curb poverty. However, they 
diverge in notable features such as working assumptions 
and state responsibilities. The old approach is based on 
the governments’ direct interventions, control, and 
concessionary credit for agriculture. However, the new 
approach reflects financial liberalization, including 
creating a favorable policy environment while minimizing 
direct government intervention in agricultural lending 
(Yaron, 2004).  
Formal credit for agriculture in Afghanistan started 
in 1954 by establishing the government-owned ACIB. 
The bank aimed to advance agriculture sector in the 
country and decrease farmers’ dependency on informal 
credit. The bank sanctioned loans to many farmers with 
concessionary interest rates. However, given the lack of 
proper loan evaluation, screening process, and capacity, 
the bank hardly achieved self-sufficiency (Norvell, 1973). 
In 1969, ACIB was converted to the Agriculture 
Development Bank. The new bank revised the loan 
appraisal procedure and started with a flexible lending 
policy, resulting in increased performance. The ADB 
would disburse credit directly to farmers and cooperatives. 
Apart from providing credit, the bank, with the help of 
cooperatives, provided farmers’ education programs to 
increase credit effectiveness. The credit increased the 
availability of agricultural equipment in the country. 
However, the bank’s credit was inadequate and biased 
toward large farmers, tending to neglect poor farming 
households (Gibbs, 1986). 
Along with ADB, five other state-owned banks also 
actively operate in the country and provide loans to other 
sectors. 
The Soviet occupation halted formal credit and 
development activities following the civil war. The six 
state-owned banks became inactive and were barely 
operational during the war. The development activities in 
the country were negligible (Hussain, 2009). Without 
formal financial activities, farmers depended on the 
informal financial sector to meet the demand for financial 
services, including funding agricultural activities in rural 
areas. This period is the gap era in the formal credit 
provision for agriculture. In the gap era, the country’s 
Islamization, which is linked with providing financial 
services and subsequently influences the country’s 
financial sector, is notable. Figure 2. depicts the historical 
perspectives and the characteristics of formal agricultural 
credit in Afghanistan.  
The new approach of providing formal agricultural 
credit, as mentioned earlier, is based on financial 
liberalization, consistent with the economic liberalization 
process and policies implemented by states.  This 
approach assumes that financial liberalization and 
deregulation lead to the high growth of developing 
countries, savings, and efficient capital use. It also 
assumes non-subsidized financial services are essential 
tools for growth and poverty reduction. Therefore, the 
new approach responds to the old approach’s failure, 
which many developing countries implemented in the 
1980s (United Nations, 2009). However, Afghanistan’s 
financial sector was reactivated with the new approach 
after the new government was formed in 2001. Hence, 
Afghanistan lags in applying the new approach for around 
two decades. Private commercial banks, non-
governmental organizations, and donor-funded 
microfinance institutions emerged. They functioned 
without direct intervention and control from the 
government.  
In the post-gap era, financial institutions provide 
credit to farmers in the country via three channels. The 
first channel comprises commercial banks, supervised by 
the central bank. Twelve licensed banks operate in the 
country. The second channel comprises microfinance 
institutions, regulated by the MISFA, an apex organization 
of microfinance institutions in Afghanistan. MISFA 
coordinates donor support and boosts international and 
local non-governmental organizations’ entry into the 
sector to expand credit access. Microfinance institutions 
operate in the rural and urban areas of Afghanistan. The 
third channel comprises other non-banking financial 
institutions, particularly ADF, initially a donor-funded 
organization that reports to the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Irrigation, and Livestock. The ADF targets commercial 
farmers and agribusinesses. It gives credit to farmers in 
an indirect or two-tier way. ADF mainly provides credit 
via cooperatives and associations.
Therefore, formal agricultural credit provision in 
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the country occurs in a more fragmented manner. A single 
mechanism to channel credit to the farming sector does 
not exist. Financial institutions lack coordination in credit 
provision for the farming sector. No clear, unified policy 
exists for formal agricultural credit, followed by all 
financial institutions. Furthermore, banking laws, policies, 
and reports of commercial banks show that the legal and 
regulatory frameworks for financial activities do not 
adequately consider the specificity of agriculture credit. 
Central bank laws and regulations do not prioritize 
lending to the farming sector. Commercial bank reports 
suggest that banks are reluctant to supply credit in the 
remote rural areas and for agricultural purposes. Although 
seven of 12 banks incorporate agricultural credit in their 
policies, the percentage of loans disbursed by commercial 
banks to agriculture is low. Commercial banks are 
indispensable because the bulk of financial resources 
circulate through them in Afghanistan. Without them, 
reaching many farmers by other financial institutions will 
be challenging.
However, the coverage and scale of operation of the 
non-bank financial institutions are shallow. For example, 
the ADF, the leading financial institution with an 
agricultural funding approach, functions only in six of 34 
provinces. Non-bank financial institutions also face 
sustainability issues. Parto and Regmi (2008) state that 
microfinance institutions in Afghanistan struggle with 
financial sustainability. Per Kinde (2012), the high cost of 
such sustainability is concerning for non-bank financial 
institutions. 
Policy documents under the new approach are 
ambitious. However, they rarely reflect the country 
context. For example, according to Yaron (2004, p. 140), 
under the old approach of agricultural credit, 
underinvestment in rural infrastructure (e.g., roads) and 
human resources (e.g., education) is acceptable. However, 
these are necessary for the new approach, as these 
positively affect social and geographical proximity to the 
financial institutions. Afghanistan struggles with rural 
infrastructure (Blumenstock et al., 2018). Similarly, the 
education level is low in rural areas. These factors affect 
the outreach of financial institutions in rural areas. 
Therefore, the pre-conditions to favor strong credit 
growth under the new approach are not in place.
Finally and importantly, the religious aspect of 
formal credit is evident from the policy documents and 
reports. Considering the socio-cultural context of 
Afghanistan, where most people are Muslim, religious 
constraints are crucial deterrents to conventional formal 
agricultural credit participation. Islamic banking and 
finance were ignored during the formation of financial 
institutions after the establishment of the new government 
Figure 2   Characteristics of formal agricultural credit in Afghanistan
Source: Author’s summary based on the review of policy documents and reports listed in Table 1.
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in 2001. Nonetheless, it has recently been introduced into 
the banking sector of Afghanistan. The country’s banking 
law integrated Islamic banking in 2014. Out of 12 banks, 
one full-fledged Islamic bank and six Islamic sections in 
conventional banks operate (DAB, 2015). Other non-
bank financial institutions partly provide Islamic credit. 
However, the dominant mode of credit is conventional 
credit. 
Figure 2. is a snapshot that reveals the formal 
agricultural credit historical perspectives and 
characteristics in Afghanistan.
2   Challenges faced by farmers in using formal credit
Table 2 reveals the descriptive statistics of the 
households. In terms of education, farmers have a lower 
education level (7.14 years). The literacy rate is commonly 
low in Afghanistan-owing to the long-lasting war and 
instability following the Soviet invasion in 1980. 
According to Central Statistics Organization (2018), the 
literacy rate for adults is only 34 percent and for youth is 
52 percent in Afghanistan. In our sample, 39.8 percent of 
the family heads were not ever educated formally. 
Although most households are smallholders, the farmers 
had, on average, 6.38 Jeribs3)  of agricultural land. The 
mean land size in Afghanistan is 5.1 jeribs (Central 
Statistics Organization, 2018). The land is considered as 
a significant contributing factor of household financial 
behaviors. The mean distance from the cities is 10.1 km. 
The average agricultural experience of the farmers is 22 
years. About 26 percent of the farmers were getting non-
farm income  (Table 2).
Figure 3 displays the results of the Friedman test. It 
shows that overall, the various six challenges ranked by 
farmers are significantly different from each other. It also 
reveals that the difficulty in providing collateral/guarantor 
and the cumbersome process of obtaining credit are the 
two highly ranked challenges. These challenges are 
explained in detail in the next sub-section. They were 
cross validated in the analysis of interviews with key 
informants. 
The results of the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests, 
which were conducted for the pairwise comparison of the 
challenges faced by the farmers, show that, in general, the 
first two highly ranked challenges shown in Figure 3 are 
statistically different from the last three challenges, which 
were ranked low. Furthermore, the first two highly ranked 
challenges are not statistically different between each 
other, so they are equally important for consideration. 
Moreover, distance and unsuitable repayment conditions 
are not significantly different from each other.
3   Challenges to the expansion of formal agricultural 
credit in Afghanistan
Figure 4. provides a glimpse of how formal credit is 
constrained in Afghanistan. Five themes emerged from 
the interview analysis. These themes are challenges to the 
expansion of agricultural credit in the country. They are 
discussed one by one as follows.
ⅰ  High vulnerability of farmers
Farmers’ vulnerability is higher in the country, 
influenced by their exposure to systematic risk in 
agriculture (i.e., the production and marketing risks). 
Production risk arises due to climate-related disasters and 
pests. Most respondents opined that the agriculture-based 
Table 2   Descriptive statistics of the farmers who obtained formal credit
Socioeconomic characteristics Mean SD Max Min
Education (years) 7.14 5.90 17 0.0
Farm size (Jeribs) 6.38 4.32 19 0.8
Distance from the city/town (km) 10.10 3.57 19 5.0
Farming experience (years) 22.00 11.37 50 3.0
Access to extension (% access) 78.80 – 1 0.0
Non-agricultural income (% yes) 26.20 – 1 0.0
Membership in farmers’ association (%yes) 12.12 – 1 0.0
Registered land documents (% yes) 47.40 – 1 0.0
Livestock (% yes) 71.70 – 1 0.0
Note: 1 hectare is equal to 5 jeribs.
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Figure 3   Challenges faced by farmers in using formal credit
Figure 4   Thematic map of the challenges to the expansion of agricultural credit
Source: interviews, 2019.
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livelihoods in Afghanistan are more susceptible to 
production risk and instabilities. Afghanistan is a 
mountainous country with an arid and semi-arid climate. 
Afghanistan is among the most vulnerable country to 
climate change. The most probable natural catastrophes 
in the country are drought and floods (Savage et al., 
2009). The outbreak of pests is also an essential source of 
production risks. Additionally, with low access to capital, 
farmers cannot afford pesticides and pest control 
equipment. Farmers also lack adequate knowledge about 
effective pest control practices, such as Integrated Pest 
Management. 
Price fluctuation in the country leads to market risk 
due to variations in local production and international 
trade problems. Changes in domestic agricultural output 
occur due to the glut of crops in the peak season, resulting 
in low prices. 
Further, much of the country’s agricultural produce, 
especially fruits and vegetables, are exported to India and 
Pakistan. The Pakistani border closes per the political 
tension, affecting prices in Afghanistan. Respondents 
said the border closed three times in 2018, thus making 
exports impossible. According to Pain (2019), demand 
for high-value agricultural products inside Afghanistan is 
low, resulting in a decrease in prices, thus discouraging 
farmers from obtaining formal agricultural credit due to 
low repayment confidence levels. Moreover, given the 
price fluctuation of agricultural produce, input price 
volatility is also a source of risk. Per the respondents, 
when the prices of inputs increase, farmers’ net profit 
decreases, affecting their repayment capability. Input 
price volatility exists more in the livestock subsector, 
which increases the risk when combined with the market 
and production risk. 
Lenders’ credit risk emerges from farmers’ 
vulnerability. To mitigate the risk, they either avoid 
lending to farmers or enforce stringent conditions before 
granting credit. According to the financial institutions’ 
officials, agriculture is a risky business in Afghanistan. It 
is challenging for farmers and financial institutions to 
predict unfavorable times in their farming activities. 
Farmers cannot produce per their plan. In some cases, 
production decreases such that products cannot recover 
costs. Thus, the risk mitigation measures are rational for 
financial institutions. According to the World Bank 
(2018), systematic risk is a significant deterrent for 
commercial banks in Afghanistan for lending to the 
agriculture sector.
A higher risk increases the importance of insurance 
for the agriculture sector (Llanto, 2007), which does not 
exist in Afghanistan.
The high vulnerability and risk in Afghanistan’s 
agriculture sector demand a thorough and robust policy 
framework with formal credit policy complaints and 
farmer capabilities. According to Meyer (2011), due to 
risks and complicated agricultural features, the most 
successful agricultural finance resulted from “careful 
long-term institutional development.” 
Low productivity affects farmers’ confidence and 
ability to repay; thus, they avoid formal credit. In 
Afghanistan, the productivity in farming is low due to 
subsistence farming, the inability to pay for inputs, and 
farmers’ lack of farming and business management skills. 
Due to subsistence farming, other than food, farmers can 
barely provide for their families. They hardly apply 
improved inputs in their farms due to their low access to 
capital. Farmers only cultivate and rarely assess their 
investment with generated profits. Consequently, it 
decreases self-confidence in their capacity to repay the 
credit.
Vulnerability and low productivity relate to the 
overall development of the farming sector in Afghanistan. 
According to some respondents, there is a two-way 
relationship between agricultural credit and agricultural 
development. The growth in the farming sector should 
support agricultural credit. Gonzalez-Vega (2003) states 
that the macroeconomic and sector development policies 
are also crucial for agricultural credit sustainability.
ⅱ   Less active real estate market in the rural areas
Collateral has a critical role in obtaining credit for 
farmers. It increases a farmer’s ability to get external 
financial resources. Financial institutions employ the 
pledging of assets as a strategy to screen a farmer’s 
creditworthiness and decrease default risk (Akram and 
Hussain, 2008). The respondents opined that commercial 
banks in Afghanistan are not confident in lending without 
collateral. Moreover, farmers without title deeds for their 
land are not interested in credit. They believe that they 
will not be given credit without any registered collateral. 
However, in general, most rural credit in Afghanistan 
does not require collateral, thus decreasing participation 
in formal credit and increasing lenders’ risk. Properties 
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without a clear title despite long-term occupancy are 
considered as “dead capital” (Bresnyan, 2004). 
Approximately 80% of the properties in rural areas of the 
country do not have title deeds in Afghanistan (NSIA, 
2019). Apart from the low rate of title deeds, the land’s 
value and size in the farther areas are small. Bank officials 
hold that they require collateral with the value of at least 
150 to 200% of the credit. Therefore, for a more substantial 
amount of loans, agricultural land collateral may not be 
sufficient.
Many farmers do not directly own land in 
Afghanistan. They jointly own it along with their siblings 
or other relatives. They have their property registered 
officially on their parents’ or grandparents’ titles since the 
transfer of title deed is a lengthy procedure. Due to the 
lack of a well-functioning court system in the country, the 
transfer requires an average of 155 days (MUDH, 2017). 
Thus, farmers are discouraged from transferring the title 
of their properties. 
In some cases, farmers are not landowners. They 
continue their farming as sharecroppers. Sharecroppers 
cultivate a significant portion of agricultural land in 
Afghanistan (Maletta, 2007). In this case, a sharecropper 
cannot provide the collateral of the land he cultivates to 
secure credit. Sharecroppers need credit for working 
capital for the short to medium term.
Financial institutions also accept guarantees besides 
the sizable collateral. However, guarantees cannot 
adequately remove the credit constraints of the collateral-
less cash-starved farmers. Providing a guarantor induces 
a farmer to depend on other people, as in obtaining 
informal credit. Banks and financial institutions also 
accept movable property, such as machinery, valuable 
equipment, and jewelry, as collateral. However, such a 
pledge is more feasible in urban areas. Farmers, especially 
smallholders, may not possess these assets. Small farmers 
usually possess livestock that cannot work as collateral 
for cash.
ⅲ   Operational challenges
This theme includes the frequency of investment 
returns, geographical dispersion, insecurity, high 
transaction cost, low capacity, and complicated procedure. 
Given the characteristics of the agriculture sector’s 
production process, farmers’ investment revolves 
periodically and infrequently, mostly twice or sometimes 
three times a year. For capital investment, the gains are 
significantly much lengthier. Longer credit maturities and 
installments are riskier for financial institutions, causing a 
liquidity management problem and increasing transaction 
costs for financial institutions. Moreover, farmers with no 
non-farm income do not go for credit if it does not match 
their cash flow. As discussed earlier, farming activities 
are prone to seasonality, better revealed in farmers’ cash 
flow. A slower investment turnover generates low profit 
relative to other sectors with quick capital flows. A 
prolonged credit maturity and variable installments are 
riskier and further challenges financial institutions, which 
must sanction seasonal loans with less frequent and 
irregular installments to meet the farmers’ cash turnover. 
Such turnover requires a robust loan assessment and 
monitoring mechanism, increasing the financial 
institutions’ transaction cost.
Geographical dispersion is an essential operational 
challenge. Rural areas in Afghanistan are described as 
scattering low-density communities with access and 
communication challenges and, hence, high costs of 
operation for production and marketing of agricultural 
produce and access to and delivery of financial services. 
Insecurity hampers overall development, including 
access to credit. Financial institutions are reluctant to 
sanction credit in unsecured areas because they cannot 
operate smoothly. Such regions make loan appraisal and 
monitoring challenging. They also increase transaction 
costs. According to respondents, security constraints also 
trigger educated people to abandon rural areas. Educated 
people are the most likely to participate in formal 
agricultural credit. According to Kantor (2009), insecurity 
is not under the control of financial institutions in 
Afghanistan.
Low capacity is a supply-side challenge. Most 
financial institutions are small-sized, and their coverage 
is exceedingly low. Their offices and branches are located 
in cities; however, farming activities are rural. Out of 401 
rural districts in the country, only four districts have 
formal financial institution offices that sanction loans to 
rural people and farmers. Further, their field staff, who 
process loans and conduct awareness programs, are 
inadequate. Moreover, the staff is low in competence, 
especially in agricultural finance and Islamic banking. 
Respondents believe that bank staff are more qualified in 
conventional banking and non-agricultural credit. No 
specific institution in the country trains people in Islamic 
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finance. Staff training by financial institutions to handle 
agricultural lending is inadequate. Financial institutions 
dealing with agricultural credit need professionals with 
adequate skills (Hollinger, 2011). Similarly, skillful 
professionals are also required for financial institutions 
that provide credit in compliance with Islamic banking 
(Ahmad and Hassan, 2007).
The respondents held that the credit disbursement 
procedure is complex and time-consuming. They used 
either of these descriptions: “delay in processing credit, 
procedural complication by the financial institutions” and 
“Long screening process.” Borrowers get frustrated 
sometimes with the procedure and avoid credit since they 
must be present for many days at the financial institutions 
to obtain credit. Thus, they lose day wages and incur 
lunch and transportation expenses, making credit costly. 
Moreover, a delayed credit will not serve the desired 
purpose. Financial institutions’ credit disbursement 
procedure is lengthy due to their rigorous screening 
procedure to ensure borrowers will not default. The 
lengthy process is also due to the complexity of attesting 
collateral in the court. This finding agrees with Dhakshana 
and Rajandran (2018), Ayegba and Ikani (2013), and 
Bashir and Azeem (2008).
ⅳ   Societal challenges
The societal challenges include religious 
constraints, educational constraints, and distrust of formal 
institutions. Islam prohibits conventional interest-based 
financial activities (Saqib, 2011). People in Muslim-
majority countries have negative perceptions of 
conventional financial operations, including availing 
credit. Therefore, if the credit is interest-based (usury-
based), it causes voluntary credit exclusion. All 
respondents opined to this. Masaood and Maharjan (2020) 
found that religious constraints were among the highest-
ranked reasons for avoiding formal agricultural credit in 
Afghanistan. According to ADF (2019), farmers prefer 
Islamic credit in Afghanistan’s rural areas. However, 
even though interest-based transactions are unpopular, 
the country’s dominant formal agricultural credit is 
conventional credit. Respondents opined that 
Afghanistan’s farming community is religious and 
traditionalistic; they value religion against their economic 
means. Even so, it is prudent to retain our religious values 
while achieving economic and agricultural development. 
Many studies recommend Islamic credit (also 
called Sharia-compliant credit) for agriculture in Muslim 
countries (Saqib, 2011, Hassan et al., 2012; Saiti et al., 
2018). Sharia-compliant credit can increase farmers’ 
confidence in formal credit participation and their income 
and asset base (Hassan et al., 2012). Its purpose is similar 
to conventional credit, yet its various operational 
specifications vary in evading interest (usury) (Saqib, 
2011).
Farmers are not aware of existing financial services 
and their offerings due to ineffective marketing activities 
of financial institutions. The government is also yet to 
build awareness for participating in credit. Hence, they 
rely on informal credit. The lack of financial awareness 
also decreases demand and the effective use of credit. 
Further, the distance of farmers from financial institutions 
also affects awareness. As noted earlier, the offices of 
formal financial institutions are in the cities. The lack of 
rural branches and financial institutions’ field staff in 
remote areas decrease awareness.
Nevertheless, Islamic banking’s lesser dominance 
is due to operational inefficiency by the lack of local 
experts in Islamic banking and finance. Financial 
institutions are dependent on foreign staff who are paid 
vast sums of money.  Furthermore, people remain 
skeptical about Islamic banking and its products in the 
country. Islamic banking and finance have been newly 
introduced into Afghanistan (Safi et al., 2020). Per the 
respondents, farmers cannot readily differentiate Islamic 
from conventional banking. Further, expanding Islamic 
banking in rural areas requires effective marketing and 
awareness programs. However, per Safi et al. (2020), 
Islamic banking has been expanding in Kabul, the 
country’s capital. Approximately 60% of bank users 
understand Islamic banking. However, their survey 
covers only urban areas—a high literacy environment. 
Educational constraints are another crucial societal 
challenge, given the expansion of formal agricultural 
credit in the country. The farmers are illiterate and 
uninformed about financial management practices. As 
mentioned in the sub-section 4.2 of this section, the 
average year of education is approximately seven years. 
Furthermore, approximately 40% of farmers were 
illiterate and never attended any formal education. They 
hardly understand the procedural and other requirements 
for obtaining formal agricultural credit. They barely keep 
records of farming operations, making it challenging for 
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financial institution staff to assess their repayment 
capability accurately.
Moreover, they do not know how to utilize loans 
optimally. Higher capacity and human capital positively 
affect investment potential and the need for credit. Higher 
education of the farmers also increases farmers’ technical 
efficiency (Abdallah, 2016b). 
Distrust in formal institutions is also a societal 
challenge. Due to the torment and corruption of 
government bureaucracy, people try to avoid the 
government and formal institutions. There is also a 
misconception among the farmers about the commercial 
banks. They assume that commercial banks accumulate 
large profits and do not serve communities. Thus, they 
avoid bank credit. Mitigating this misconception is 
especially important, as commercial banks are essential 
in creating liquidity and providing credit for economic 
growth. This type of misconception and distrust leads to 
voluntary credit exclusion. Bizhan (2013) notes that 
people do not trust the Afghan government due to high 
corruption and a lack of transparency. Azimy et al. (2020) 
found that Afghan farmers do not prefer government 
institutions.
Ⅴ   Conclusion and policy implications
Formal agricultural credit is crucial for the 
development of the agriculture sector in Afghanistan. 
However, the flow of formal credit to the sector is 
deficient. The country’s formal financial sector reactivated 
after 2002 by forming various financial institutions. Since 
then, the formal agricultural credit has been provided to 
the farmers in a fragmented manner through various 
financial institutions. Nevertheless, a unified regulatory 
mechanism to supervise all the formal agricultural credit 
activities does not exist. Furthermore, the financial 
institutions in the country function more in a financially 
liberalized way. The Government does not directly 
control these financial institutions. Commercial banks are 
reluctant to supply credit for agricultural purposes due to 
their risk-averse nature. The coverage of other financial 
institutions is too low to reach a significant number of 
farmers. 
In the formal financial sector of Afghanistan, the 
conventional interest-based credit is dominant, which is 
prohibited in Islam. Consequently, people negatively 
perceive formal credit in the country. After the 
Islamization in the country in the 1990s, the religious 
aspect of financial activities became especially important. 
However, the country’s financial sector ignored the 
credit’s religious background while resuming in the early 
2010s. Islamic banking and finance have recently been 
introduced to the formal financial industry of the country. 
If the financial institutions do not address the religious 
aspects, it becomes a significant societal challenge, 
causing voluntary credit exclusion. Hence, to increase 
farmers’ confidence, Sharia-compliant credit should be 
provided to the farmers. As discussed earlier, it has 
various forms and can work better for agriculture.
Among the various challenges, the difficulty in 
providing loan security and lengthy procedures were 
ranked higher by the farmers while using formal 
agricultural credit. Most of the farmers had trouble 
providing guarantees and collateral to obtain credit.
The key patterns identified and extracted from the 
key informants’ interviews are farmers’ high vulnerability 
due to production and marketing risk, low productivity, 
less active real estate market, operational challenges, and 
societal challenges. These challenges have hampered the 
expansion of formal credit for farmers in Afghanistan. 
Low access to credit, in turn, affects farmers’ productivity, 
income and causes them to stay trapped in poverty. The 
formal credit expansion challenges in the country 
reinforce themselves and push the poverty trap to endure. 
To shatter the vicious cycle of poverty, the 
Government should enhance its role in agricultural credit. 
It should establish a unified regulatory and supervisory 
mechanism that should coordinate and mainstream all 
formal agricultural credit activities, emphasize financial 
education to farmers, and stress capacity building in 
agriculture and Sharia-compliant credit.
Since agriculture is a highly risky venture in 
Afghanistan, and farmers’ productivity is low, the 
financial institutions should supplement technical 
assistance to credit provision. They should train farmers 
in farm management, production techniques, and risk 
diversification by trained and qualified staff, which can 
improve credit effectiveness (Arene, 1992; Bashir and 
Azeem, 2008), and can also be a risk mitigation tool for 
both financial institutions and farmers. Technical 
assistance may also help in preventing the misuse of 
credit.
Since unclear property rights affect farmers’ 
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capability to utilize the land as collateral for credit, 
registering and formalizing agricultural land can convert 
this dead capital into living capital. Once registered, the 
property can be used as collateral for obtaining loans, 
thus opening an essential means of access to formal credit 
for agricultural development. Hence, proper measures to 
protect land rights should be taken. However, this may 
not come in the short run; therefore, farmers’ preferences 
regarding what type of loan security they can provide 
need to be explored.
Furthermore, to increase farmers’ credit 
participation, their preferences for the other credit features 
should also be investigated.  For example, farmers’ 
preferences concerning the financial institutions’ location, 
disbursement procedure, ownership and management of 
the financial institutions, and the repayment terms. 
Financial institutions should design agricultural credit 
products based on the revealed farmers’ preferences. 
Therefore, further studies are recommended investigating 
the preferences of farmers regarding the above-mentioned 
pertinent features of agricultural credit.
Notes 
1)  One USD=69.30 AFN.
2)  The province and district are with the same name.
3)  One Jerib is equal to 0.2 hectares.
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